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I OBJECT: THE RLUIPA AS A MODEL FOR PROTECTING
THE CONSCIENCE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS TO
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS†
ABSTRACT
In most states, the battle over same-sex marriage has become a showdown
with either gay rights activists or religious conservatives prevailing. Each side
is fearful of losing ground to the other. Many scholars have noted the threats
to religious liberty that arise upon the recognition of same-sex marriage, but
few have given significant attention to how religious liberty might be protected
without abolishing the rights of same-sex couples. This Comment focuses on
one manifestation of the conflict between same-sex rights and religious liberty:
the conflict that arises when individuals and organizations are compelled by
their religious beliefs to violate state civil rights statutes protecting same-sex
couples. Such violations expose them to civil liability for acting in accordance
with their religious beliefs.
This Comment examines the shortcomings of the United States Supreme
Court’s current free exercise jurisprudence as well as current broad-based
statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in protecting
religious objectors in the context of same-sex rights. It then proposes a
number of possible ways to protect religious objectors, concluding that while
state statute-specific exemptions would be a more direct, and perhaps
preferred, method of protecting religious objectors, the absence of state
solutions and the need to implement a uniform approach to rights of
conscience suggest a federal approach. A statute modeled on the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, (RLUIPA) would provide a more
comprehensive and balanced approach than the funding legislation that has
typically been used by Congress to protect other types of conscience rights. By
providing some protection for religious individuals, such a federal conscience
statute could lessen the tension between advocates for gay rights and
advocates for religious liberty. While this Comment focuses explicitly on
certain classes of religious objectors in the context of same-sex rights, the
† This Comment received the 2008 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and
Writing.
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proposed solution could include provisions covering any class of religious
objectors.
INTRODUCTION
But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.

—Justice Robert Jackson1
Guadalupe Benitez is a lesbian woman who decided with her partner
Joanne to have a child.2 After several unsuccessful attempts to become
pregnant, Benitez was diagnosed in 1999 with polycystic ovarian syndrome, a
condition that is characterized by irregular ovulation.3 As a result, Benitez was
referred to the North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. (North Coast),
where she met with Dr. Christine Brody, an obstetrician–gynecologist.4 Dr.
Brody informed Benitez of the possibility of using a procedure called
intrauterine insemination (IUI) to get pregnant.5 Unlike the more common
practice of self-insemination that Benitez had been using, during IUI a doctor
inserts semen directly into the patient’s uterus through a catheter.6 In
explaining this procedure, however, Dr. Brody told Benitez up front that if IUI
became necessary, she would not be able to perform the procedure for Benitez
because of her religious beliefs.7
Following their initial conversation, Dr. Brody continued to treat Benitez
for infertility, performing diagnostic surgery and prescribing ovulationinducing medication to be used in conjunction with self-insemination.8 At
some point in 2000, based in part on Dr. Brody’s advice, Benitez decided to try
IUI.9 Dr. Douglas Fenton, another physician at North Coast, was asked to
1
2

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal.

2008).
3

Id.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. Dr. Brody asserts that her religious beliefs precluded her from performing IUI, or any other medical
procedure that facilitates pregnancy, for any unmarried woman, but Benitez suspects that Dr. Brody’s refusal
was based on her sexual orientation. Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 964.
4
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perform the procedure, but he also refused because of his religious beliefs.10
Dr. Fenton referred Benitez to a physician outside the North Coast practice
who performed the IUI.11 Benitez did not become pregnant as a result of the
procedure but eventually resorted to in vitro fertilization, which enabled her to
conceive in 2001.12 Shortly thereafter, Benitez filed suit against North Coast,
Brody and Fenton, alleging violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.13 Among
other defenses, Brody and Fenton asserted that their refusal to perform IUI for
Benitez was protected under the free exercise clauses of the U.S. and
California constitutions.14
In August 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled on the doctors’
defenses, holding that, to the extent their refusal to perform the procedure was
based on Benitez’s sexual orientation, the act of refusal was not protected
under either the federal or state constitutions.15 Advocates for same-sex rights
celebrated the decision as a victory over “fundamentalist Christian doctors.”16
Benitez spoke out saying, “it’s a win for everyone, because anyone could be
the next target if doctors are allowed to pick and choose their patients based on
religious views about other groups of people.”17 Not everyone shared this
enthusiasm, however. Americans United for Life, an anti-abortion advocacy
group, issued a news release entitled “California Supreme Court Ruling
Threatens Medical Care and Religious Freedom.”18 The group argued that the
decision will only worsen the shortage of healthcare workers and that,

10

Id.
Id. At the time, Dr. Fenton believed that Benitez would be using fresh sperm in the procedure, and
since he was the only doctor at North Coast who was licensed to prepare fresh sperm, Dr. Fenton referred
Benitez to Dr. Michael Kettle, a physician outside the North Coast practice. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 967; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007).
14 N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 967.
15 Id. at 968–69. Although the doctors claim that their decision was based on the plaintiff’s marital status
rather than her sexual orientation, and therefore they did not violate the state civil rights statute, regardless of
the doctors’ intentions in this particular case, North Coast illustrates of the type of conflict that may arise
between the rights of a lesbian patient and the religious conscience of a doctor whose religious beliefs prohibit
him or her from performing IUI for that patient.
16 Press Release, Lambda Legal, California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Lambda Legal Lesbian
Client Denied Infertility Treatment by Christian Fundamentalist Doctors (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.
lambdalegal.org/news/pr/california-supreme-court-benitez-decision.html.
17 Id.
18 Press Release, Matthew Eppinette, Americans United for Life, California Supreme Court Ruling
Threatens Medical Care and Religious Freedom (Aug. 18, 2008), http://blog.aul.org/2008/08/18/californiasupreme-court-ruling-threatens-medical-care-and-religious-freedom/.
11
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ultimately, forcing healthcare workers to perform procedures that violate their
conscience will not benefit patients.19
The dispute in North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group Inc. v. San
Diego County Superior Court is just one example of the sort of conflict that
can arise between the statutory right of a same sex couple to be free from
discrimination and the right to religious freedom of a private party who refuses
to perform procedures that violate their conscience. In recent years, similar
conflicts have arisen between individuals seeking to effect their rights to
reproductive health services, including abortion, and health care providers
who, for example, refuse to perform abortions or dispense oral contraception.20
This Comment specifically addresses conflicts that, as in North Coast, arise
between the rights of same-sex couples and the religious liberty of those who
object to performing certain services for same-sex couples. Part I of this
Comment discusses the current landscape of rights afforded to same-sex
couples under state and federal law and provides examples of specific conflicts
that could arise.21 This Part suggests that in determining the proper scope of
any religious exemptions, potential conflicts should be evaluated based on
several factors, including the availability of alternative service providers and
how directly the views of the individual or organization refusing to provide
services conflict with the requirements of the law protecting same-sex couples.
Part II presents both policy-based arguments and historical precedents for
providing exemptions for certain categories of religious objectors whose duties
conflict with same-sex rights.22 This discussion demonstrates that far from
19

Id.
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77 (Douglas
Laycock, et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter EMERGING CONFLICTS] (describing various state and federal responses
to protect doctors and pharmacists who refuse to perform abortions or issue contraceptives).
21 This Comment takes no position on the appropriateness of laws either prohibiting or enabling samesex marriage. Further, although this Comment suggests certain limited religious exemptions from laws
protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it in no way seeks to encourage such
discrimination or to legitimize bigotry toward same-sex couples.
22 This Comment touches on some of the history and policy reasons for protecting religious objectors, but
for a more comprehensive treatment of this issue, see J. Brady Brammer, Religious Groups and the Gay Rights
Movement: Recognizing Common Ground, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 995 (2006) (arguing that suppression of
religious speech in opposition to the gay rights movement would erode fundamental conscience rights
important to both gay rights and religious activists); Alvin C. Lin, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws
and the Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 GEO. L.J.
719 (2001) (arguing for the general applicability test for religious freedom claims to avoid creating exemptions
from antidiscrimination statutes); Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the
Eroding Moral Market-Place, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 85–86 (2006) (arguing for a marketplace
approach to protecting the right of conscience for pharmacists).
20

EAST GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

10/30/2009 3:13:53 PM

I OBJECT: THE RLUIPA AS A MODEL

263

being a radical solution, religious exemptions are grounded in the American
historical tradition.
Part III discusses the shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s current free
exercise jurisprudence, demonstrating that the U.S. Constitution, as currently
interpreted by the Court, provides little functional protection for religious
objectors in the context of same-sex rights. Part III also examines free exercise
protections under state constitutions and concludes that, while state
constitutions may offer more protection for religious objectors than the U.S.
Constitution, the end result is often the same. Part IV analyzes the
effectiveness of a variety of statutes that have been used to expand the free
exercise of religion, including statute-specific exemptions as well as statutes
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which raise the level of
scrutiny for certain free exercise claims. Part IV concludes that these statutes
do not adequately protect religious objectors23 in the context of same-sex
marriage.
Given the diversity of state statutes and constitutional provisions protecting
free exercise and the weak interpretations by courts of these provisions, Part V
argues that a federal statute that provides religious exemptions is the best way
to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights of same-sex couples and
the religious liberty of religious objectors. Specifically, a federal statute
modeled on RLUIPA, which effectively requires the application of strict
scrutiny to free exercise claims against states involving prisoners and land use,
would provide a balanced, uniform approach to protecting the rights of
religious objectors in all states without nullifying the rights of same-sex
couples.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAME-SEX RIGHTS AND RELIGION
Over the past few decades, much controversy has ensued over the issue of
same-sex relationships.24 Scholars have debated from religious, social, and
economic perspectives the pros and cons of allowing same-sex marriage, civil

23 Throughout this Comment, this phrase will be used to refer to any individual whose religious beliefs
cause him or her to refuse to perform a legally recognized obligation.
24 Kari Huus, Battle Joined over Same-Sex Marriage: Regional Cases Foreshadow Fight over U.S.
Constitution, MSNBC, Feb. 27, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4304099/.
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unions, and other legal relationships.25 Legislatures have responded to these
debates in a variety of ways. Section A provides an overview of the current
state of the law regarding the rights of same-sex couples. Section B examines
the scope of the conflicts that arise between one party’s civil rights to engage
in same-sex relationships26 and another party’s rights to religious freedom,
arguing that the more direct the religious objector’s role in establishing
marriage or family, the greater the need for religious exemptions from laws
that establish the rights of same-sex couples.
A. Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under Current Law
The country is currently divided over the issue of same-sex relationships.27
The rights afforded same-sex couples by the federal government are slim,
mirroring the rights of same-sex couples in the majority of states.28 States
have responded to the issue of same-sex marriage in a variety of ways. Some
have extended a variety of rights to same-sex couples, including civil rights,
civil unions, and same-sex marriage. Some have explicitly foreclosed the right
to same-sex marriage while still providing civil rights or civil unions.29 An
overview of these state responses is necessary to understand the scope of the
conflict between the right to same-sex marriage and religious liberty, the
present patchwork of same-sex rights implicated in this conflict, and the
continuing reluctance by many states and the federal government to recognize
same-sex rights.

25 See, e.g., Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & Economics Defense of
Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 115 (2001) (presenting an economic rationale for recognizing
same-sex marriage); Erwin Chemerinsky, Same Sex Marriage: An Essential Step Towards Equality, 34 SW. U.
L. REV. 579, 580 (2005) (“[A]t the very least, civil union has to be regarded as a basic civil right.”); George W.
Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 581, 593–644 (1999) (defending the rationales
for traditional, heterosexual marriage and arguing against recognition of same-sex marriage); Paul Royal, The
Right to Say “I Do”: The Legality of Same-Sex Marriage, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 245, 246 (1996)
(“[S]tates should allow gay marriages not only because the present marriage statutes are unconstitutional, but
also because no valid policy supports the ban.”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a
Man and a Woman, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 1365 (arguing that the recognition of same-sex marriage has detrimental
effects on society).
26 Throughout this article, the phrase “rights of same-sex couples” will be used to denote the right to
same-sex marriage as well as the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation.
27 See Andrea Stone, Battle over Gay Marriage Renewed on California Ballot, USA TODAY, June 12,
2008, at 2A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-06-11-Gaymarriage_N.htm (describing
the renewed struggle over same-sex marriage in various states).
28 See Breslau, infra note 40.
29 See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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1. Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under Federal Law
Although two of the Court’s decisions have expanded the rights of samesex couples,30 neither the Court nor Congress has recognized a right to samesex marriage or imposed a broad prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. The Court recognized a right to privacy for samesex couples in Lawrence v. Texas, where it struck down a Texas law that
prohibited certain homosexual conduct.31 The Court based its decision on the
due process liberty interests of the defendants, who were charged under the
Texas criminal statute at issue.32
Prior to Lawrence, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited any action by the state
or by local governments to grant “special rights” or protections to
homosexuals.33 The Court found that the Colorado provision violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it had no rational basis.34 While Lawrence
and Romer indicate that the Court might be willing to recognize constitutional
rights for same-sex couples at some point in the future, the Court has not gone
so far as to recognize a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses, or designate sexual orientation as a
suspect classification justifying strict scrutiny.35
Currently, federal legislation offers even less protection for same-sex
couples than the Court’s jurisprudence. Discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is not covered by federal civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 Furthermore, the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) rejects the notion of same-sex marriage by specifically defining
marriage—for federal purposes—as a union between a man and a woman.37

30

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
32 Id. at 562–63.
33 Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
34 See id. at 635 (“We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or
discrete objective.”).
35 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 787 (3d. ed. 2006).
36 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e(15) (2006).
37 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). Although President Obama pledged to seek a repeal of DOMA law during his
2008 presidential campaign, the law’s future remains uncertain. In the early days of his administration, the
President has avoided taking a strong stance on gay rights. See Brian Montopoli, Obama Faces Gay Groups’
Growing Anger, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/06/15/poliitcs/politicalhotsheet/entry
5090503.shtml (discussing the Obama Administration’s DOJ brief in support of DOMA and the resulting
frustration of gay rights advocates).
31
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The Executive Branch has offered some limited protection to same-sex couples
through executive orders that institute an internal policy banning
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation.38 Although
Congress and the President implemented a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in
1993, governing men and women serving in the military, the policy has
curtailed, not expanded, homosexual rights.39
2. Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under State Law
States have responded to the debate over same-sex marriage in a variety of
ways. The majority have passed laws that, like the federal DOMA, define
marriage as a union between a man and a woman.40 Unlike the federal
DOMA, however, at least thirty states have adopted these provisions as state
constitutional amendments,41 making the state definitions more difficult to
change than the federal definition. Six states currently allow same-sex
marriage.42 The high courts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa have
recognized the right to same-sex marriage under their respective state
constitutions..43 Statutes providing for same-sex marriage have been passed in
Maine,44 New Hampshire,45 and Vermont.46
38 See U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Addressing Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Federal Civilian
Employment: A Guide to Employee’s Rights, http://www.opm.gov/er/address2/Guide01.asp (last visited July
14, 2009) (referring to Executive Order 13087, which “prohibits discrimination based upon sexual orientation
within Executive Branch civilian employment”).
39 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006). While this policy was initially introduced by President Clinton to give more
rights to homosexuals than the previous policy of a complete ban on homosexuals in the military, the statute
passed by Congress maintained the ban on homosexuals in the military where there are findings of regular
homosexual conduct or where the individual openly acknowledges his or her sexual orientation. The policy
has been heavily criticized over the past fifteen years. See Mark Thompson, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Turns 15,
TIME, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1707545,00.html (discussing the history
behind the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and describing aspirations of Democrats to eliminate it).
40 See Karen Breslau, After the Vows: What’s Next in the Fight over Same-Sex Marriage, NEWSWEEK,
June 17, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/141935 (noting that as of June 2008, forty-four states had passed
prohibitions against same-sex marriage). For example, the Georgia Constitution provides that the “state shall
recognize as marriage only the union of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are
prohibited in this state.” GA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
41 E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. For a complete list of states with current
amendments, see DOMA Watch, Marriage Amendment Summary, http://www.domawatch.org/amendments/
amendmentsummary.html (last visited July 14, 2009).
42 The California Supreme Court also recognized a state constitutional right to marriage in In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008), but the court’s decision was subsequently overridden by the passage of
Proposition 8 in November 2008, an amendment to the California Constitution defining marriage as “between
a man and a woman.” Jessica Garrison, et al., ELECTION 2008: GAY MARRIAGE; Nation Watches as State
Weighs Ban; Prop. 8 Battle Drew Money and Attention from Across the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1.
43 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that a denial of marriage
rights to same-sex couples violates equal protection rights of Connecticut citizens); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub.
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Some states also grant rights to same-sex couples through laws permitting
civil unions or statutes that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation.
However, even some states that have defined marriage as a heterosexual
monogamous union have passed laws permitting civil unions for same-sex
couples and banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.47 A handful of
states provide rights to same-sex couples through civil union or domestic
partnership statutes.48 At least twenty states and the District of Columbia
currently prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment, and some of these states prohibit discrimination in housing or
places of public accommodation as well.49 Even some states that have defined
marriage as a heterosexual monogamous union provide for civil unions for
same-sex couples and prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.50
Though same-sex couples currently enjoy some rights in less than half of the
states, conflicts between same-sex rights and religious liberty have already
begun to surface.

Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples violates
equal protection rights of Massachusetts citizens); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (striking
down an Iowa statute that defined marriage as between a man and a woman as a violation of the equal
protection rights of Iowa citizens).
44 An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv.
82 (West) (providing for same-sex marriage in Maine).
45 2009- 59 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis) (providing for same-sex marriage in
New Hampshire).
46 An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, 2009-3 Vt. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 5 (LexisNexis) (providing for same-sex marriage in Vermont effective Sept. 1, 2009).
47 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 7.5 (defining marriage as between a man and a woman); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 51 (West 2007) (protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.010 (2009) (defining marriage as between a male and a female); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.010–
26.60.901 (2009) (establishing domestic partnerships for same-sex couples).
48 Through civil union or domestic partnership statutes, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, Oregon,
Washington, and the District of Columbia ensure that same-sex couples are granted at least some of the same
rights or benefits as heterosexual married couples. See Christine Nelson, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, National Conference of State Legislatures,
Mar. 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/civilunions_domesticpartnership_statutes.htm (describing the
rights given to same-sex couples in each of these states).
49 See NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., http://www.
thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_7_08.pdf (last visited July 14, 2009)
(showing a map of states that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity).
50 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 7.5 (defining marriage as between a man and a woman); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 51 (West 2007) (protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.010 (2009) (defining marriage as between a male and a female); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.010–
26.60.901 (2009) (establishing domestic partnerships for same-sex couples).
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B. Conflicts Between Same-Sex Rights and Religious Liberty
Following Massachusetts’s recognition of same-sex marriage in 2003,51
scholars began to examine the conflicts between the rights of same-sex couples
and the religious freedom of individuals and organizations opposed to samesex marriage based on religious reasons.52 Within this broad range of conflicts
lies the subset of conflicts at issue here: the civil liability of private individuals
and organizations that refuse to perform services for same-sex couples.
This section will examine two subcategories of conflicts involving samesex rights and religious objectors: “first order conflicts” and “second order
conflicts.” These categories were first defined in an essay by Robin Fretwell
Wilson, who has authored several works on the conflicts arising between
same-sex marriage and religious liberty. Wilson refers to “first order
conflicts” as those related to the solemnization of marriage itself.53 These
conflicts arise between the same-sex couple and the state or church
representatives responsible for licensing or performing the marriage
ceremony.54 “Second order conflicts” are those involving the same-sex couple
and private individuals or organizations who are not acting on behalf of the
state.55 This category of second order conflicts includes a wide spectrum of
conflicts, but this section suggests that not all of these conflicts should give
rise to a religious exemption. Instead, it will provide examples of conflicts that
should warrant an exemption and those that should not, and will suggest
several factors for distinguishing between them.
1. Examples of First Order Conflicts
To date, no U.S. court has dealt with the issue of whether ministers and
public officials are required to solemnize same-sex marriages against their
religious beliefs.56 The dearth of case law in this area could be due to the fact
that same-sex couples prefer to find officials who support same-sex marriage
51

Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
See, e.g., Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007) (arguing that the recognition of same-sex marriage could create civil
liability for religious institutions and individuals who are opposed to it and could prevent religious institutions
from accessing government benefits); Marc. D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in EMERGING
CONFLICTS, supra note 20, at 1, 1 (discussing how conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty
might impact free speech, civil liability, and possible ineligibility for public funding).
53 Wilson, supra note 20, at 97.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 95 (referring to potential court reactions to this conflict in hypothetical terms).
52
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to perform their ceremonies. However, first order conflicts still might arise in
the future. The lack of case law also is likely due in part to the small number
of states that recognize same-sex marriage.57 While the second order conflicts
described below tend to arise out of the more common civil rights statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,58 first order
conflicts will only arise in states that recognize a right to same-sex marriage.59
Currently, this right is recognized in only six states, and the rights in four of
these states were recognized in 2009.60 Further, the three states that recognize
same-sex marriage by statute, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont, provide
that members of the clergy are not required to perform same-sex marriages.61
Some scholars argue that there is no case law on first order conflicts
because potential claimants recognize that, even in states that do not formally
exempt clergy from performing same-sex marriage ceremonies, courts are
generally not allowed to involve themselves in the internal affairs of a religious
body.62 While it would be surprising, and perhaps constitutionally suspect
under the Establishment Clause, for courts to examine the reasons given by a
member of the clergy for refusing to perform a marriage ceremony, given
current court doctrines such as the ministerial exception and the avoidance of
excessive entanglement, one cannot say for certain how a court would rule on

57

See supra Part I.A.2 (listing the states that recognize same-sex marriage).
NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 49.
59 The conflict in states providing for civil unions exists when a government official refuses to participate
in the formation of a civil union. E.g., Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 430 (Vt. 2001) (affirming the dismissal
of claims brought by town clerks who asserted “that their obligation under the civil union law to either issue a
civil union license or to appoint an assistant to do so” violated their free exercise rights under the Vermont
Constitution). While this conflict deserves attention, it is less controversial than the conflict involving samesex marriage where ministers and religious institutions are affected.
60 See supra notes 43–46.
61 2009-59 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 4 (LexisNexis); An Act to End Discrimination in Civil
Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. 82 (West); An Act to Protect Religious
Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, 2009-3 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 9 (LexisNexis). New
Hampshire passed a separate religious freedom statute relating to marriage, which provides that a religious
organization:
58

shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to the solemnization of marriage, the
celebration of marriage, or the promotion of marriage through religious counseling, programs,
courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals, and such solemnization,
celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs and faith.
2009 61 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 2 (LexisNexis). Though courts have not yet interpreted the
statute, the terms “promotion of marriage” and “celebration of marriage” could have far-reaching effects.
62 Wilson, supra note 20, at 97.
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this issue.63 It is also possible that, since members of the clergy are licensed to
solemnize marriages on behalf of the state, state legislatures could require
them to perform same-sex marriages in order to keep their licenses.64 Thus,
while protections for clergy who refuse to perform same-sex marriages should
be obsolete, this is not a foregone conclusion. The exemptions proposed in this
Comment would ensure that clergy have the right to refuse to perform samesex marriage ceremonies despite any contrary state law or court ruling that
might otherwise arise.65
In those jurisdictions that recognize a right to same-sex marriage, both in
the United States and abroad, there have already been some signs of the
potential for first order conflicts. Following the Goodridge decision, which
recognized a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Massachusetts,
twelve justices of the peace in Massachusetts resigned from their positions to
avoid solemnizing same-sex marriages.66 Other countries have dealt with the
potential for first order conflicts up front to avoid dealing with them in
practice. Canada has attempted to resolve any such conflicts before they arise
by enacting a religious exemption for members of the clergy who object to
same-sex marriage, and the European Union has issued an advisory opinion
recommending exemptions for clergy opposed to same-sex marriage where
possible.67 These examples show that the United States need not wait until
conflicts arise to adopt a solution.
2. Examples of Second Order Conflicts
Second order conflicts are those that involve a conflict between the rights
of two private parties, where one party is asked to recognize the rights of the
63 It is conceivable that courts might choose to allow clergy and religious groups autonomy for decisions
on who to marry generally but with an exception stating that refusal cannot be based on the couples’ sexual
orientation.
64 This would be similar to the current situation for pharmacists in states that have passed “duty to fill”
laws requiring pharmacists to issue prescriptions for contraceptive pills despite religious objections. For an
examination of these laws, see Erica L. Norey, Note, Duty to Fill? Threats to Pharmacists’ Professional and
Business Discretion, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 95 (2007).
65 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 102 (predicting that litigation will arise over the duties of individuals and
organizations to support same-sex couples and arguing that “[s]tates can deflect this litigation, as they have
with abortion and other deeply divisive questions in healthcare, by deciding now whether issues of conscience
matter”).
66 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at
A16.
67 E.U. Network of Indep. Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4-2005: The Right to
Conscientious Objection and the Conclusions by EU Member States of Concordats with the Holy See (Dec. 14,
2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2005_4_en.pdf.
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other party in a way that would violate the first party’s religious beliefs.
Subsection a describes two examples of second order conflicts that are directly
related to marriage and family: fertility treatment and adoption. Subsection b
provides other examples of second order conflicts that are more loosely
connected to marriage and the family and offers several factors for determining
whether a second order conflict should give rise to a religious exemption.
a. Conflicts Directly Related to the Family
Two recent California lawsuits provide examples of second order conflicts
that can arise between same-sex rights and religious conscience rights in the
contexts of medical treatment and adoption. First, second order conflicts are
likely to arise in the area of healthcare and fertility services. Although the
physicians in North Coast maintained that their refusal to facilitate Benitez’s
pregnancy through IUI was based on the fact that she was unmarried, the
California Supreme Court held that if the doctors’ decision was based on
Benitz’s sexual orientation their action violated California law.68 The case
thus illustrates the potential tension between the rights of same-sex couples and
the religious liberty of healthcare workers whose job it is to facilitate
pregnancies.
The second context in which second order conflicts are likely to arise is in
the area of adoption. In Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, same-sex partners
filed suit against the owners of Adoption.com, which offers a service that
allows prospective adoptive parents to post a profile online that can be viewed
by women who plan to give their children up for adoption.69 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants’ rejection of their application to post a profile on
the website based on the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation constituted a violation of
California’s civil rights statute.70 The parties ultimately settled the dispute
before trial,71 but the Butler case is not the only example of the tension
between the rights of same-sex couples and the mission of certain adoption
organizations. Perhaps the most noted example of this conflict came in 2006,
when Catholic Charities stopped placing children for adoption in
Massachusetts after the state refused to grant the organization an exemption
68

N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal.

2008).
69

Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Id.
71 Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J.
PUB. L. 475, 476 (2008).
70
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from state law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.72 This not only shows the potential for conflict between the
religious beliefs motivating certain adoption agencies and state laws protecting
same-sex couples but also demonstrates the potential negative consequences of
failing to provide an exemption for certain adoption agencies. Rather than
serve same-sex couples, Catholic Charities chose to stop providing services in
Massachusetts altogether.73
b. Distinguishing Among Second Order Conflicts
In her statements to the press,74 Benitez, the plaintiff in North Coast,
recognized the importance of limiting religious exemptions or
accommodations in the interest of protecting same-sex couples. The California
decision thus demonstrates that without limiting accommodations for religious
objectors, laws like the California civil rights statute at issue in North Coast
will become a mere policy view of the state, offering no real protection. The
rights of same-sex couples must be considered in crafting religious
exemptions, and the exemptions must be applied in a way that protects
religious objectors without encouraging mere prejudice against same-sex
couples. This Comment suggests using the directness of participation required
by the religious objector as a way to measure the severity of the burden on the
religious objector and limit the scope of religious exemptions. For example,
the doctors in North Coast did not refuse to treat Benitez altogether; their
religious objection applied only to IUI because IUI would have directly
facilitated the pregnancy.75 Thus, the doctors’ objections were based not
merely on their patient’s sexual orientation but also on the direct link between
their own actions and the establishment of a family for Benitez.
In determining whether a particular conflict rises to a level that calls for a
religious exemption, the following factors should be considered: the nature of
the activity that the religious objector seeks an exemption from; the centrality
of the activity and/or the objection to the objector’s religious views; and the
availability of alternative service providers. Thus, if the objection is based on

72

Id. at 479–80.
See Wilson, supra note 20, at 102 (noting that by not providing an exemption for Catholic Charities,
Massachusetts “prodded Catholic Charities to cease providing adoption services altogether, forcing other
agencies to absorb the placement of those children and likely lengthening the placement process”).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 16 & 17.
75 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal.
2008).
73
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religious views of same-sex relationships, the more directly the objector
participates in establishing or promoting this relationship, the more central the
objection will be to his or her religious beliefs.76 For example, activities like
performing a marriage ceremony or providing IUI are directly related to the
establishment of the family, or a same-sex relationship, but activities like
treating a cold or serving dinner to a same-sex couple in a public restaurant are
not.77 The connection between the latter hypothetical activities of the objector
and the existence of the same-sex relationship is attenuated at best.
The difficulty, of course, is that second order conflicts range across a rather
broad spectrum, with many activities falling into gray areas. For instance,
should exemptions apply to a restaurant owner who refuses to host the
wedding ceremony or reception of a same-sex couple?78 Similarly, should an
exemption be provided for a doctor who goes one step further than Dr. Brody
and refuses to prescribe fertility medications to a lesbian patient? Part of the
analysis must rest on the interests of the same-sex couple or lesbian patient,
reviewing the availability of alternatives and the effect that allowing an
exemption will have on the purpose of the laws promoting same-sex rights. It
is difficult to pinpoint the precise dividing line between situations that call for
a religious exemption and those that do not. In applying any sort of religious
exemption, courts will need to define the scope of the exemption as applied to
the facts of a particular case. This section suggests that when defining the
scope of exemptions, courts and legislatures should consider the nature of the
activity that the religious objector seeks an exemption from, which indicates
the burden on the religious objector; the centrality of the activity and/or the
objection to the objector’s religious views, which points to the burden on the
objector and the sincerity of religious belief; and the availability of alternative
service providers, which goes to whether the obligations otherwise imposed on

76 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 87 (2d ed. 1995)
(providing the text of debates over drafts of the First Amendment religion clauses in which representatives
remark on the depth of the convictions of conscientious objectors to military service as a reason for providing
exemptions to service).
77 While the restaurant owner and doctor in these examples might argue that by serving a same-sex
couple he or she is facilitating the same-sex relationship, these activities are distinguished from “true” second
order conflicts because they do not play a direct role in forming or legitimizing a same-sex relationship or in
establishing a family. These are also the types of activities that were at the heart of the application of Title II
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006), in cases like Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–97
(1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243–44 (1964).
78 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 100 (providing examples of individuals like florists and bakers who
might refuse to participate in a same-sex ceremony).
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the religious objector are the least restrictive means of achieving the goal of
promoting the rights of same-sex couples.
II. THE POLICIES AND PRECEDENTS FOR RECOGNIZING RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS
Some scholars have argued that religious exemptions undermine the force
and purpose of the law—particularly in the area of civil rights, which
encompasses the rights of same-sex couples in certain states—and, therefore,
should not be allowed.79 This Part offers reasons for providing at least some
exemptions for religious objectors to same-sex relationships. Section A
explains why advocates for both same-sex rights and religious liberty should
favor limited exemptions for strategic policy reasons. Section B shows that the
recognition of exemptions would not be a radical departure from historical
tradition or from the historical understanding of religious liberty in the United
States.
A. Policy Reasons for Providing Religious Exemptions
Advocates of religious liberty seek exemptions from laws promoting samesex rights because these exemptions would protect the freedom of religious
professionals and organizations to act in accordance with their religious
beliefs. Under this view, exemptions would enhance religious freedom and
promote the free exercise of religion and religious pluralism, ideals that have
been valued since the founding of the United States.80 However, religious
individuals and organizations might not be the only beneficiaries of such
exemptions.
Society as a whole may benefit from ensuring that private individuals and
organizations like doctors and adoption agencies are not forced to discontinue
services because they refuse to act against deeply held religious beliefs.81
Same-sex couples could actually benefit as well. A major source of objection
to same-sex rights is that permitting same-sex marriage, or promoting same79 See Lin, supra note 22, at 721 (“[E]xemptions for religious free exercise from sexual orientation
antidiscrimination statutes undermine the two underlying purposes of the statutes: (1) eliminating from
decisionmaking . . . irrelevant moral objections to somebody’s sexual orientation; and (2) making a symbolic
gesture of acceptance and tolerance of homosexuality.”).
80 See WITTE, supra note 76, at 41 (referring to “free exercise” and “religious pluralism” as values
underlying eighteenth-century American ideas regarding religious liberty).
81 See supra Part I.B.2a.
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sex rights, will severely limit the religious liberty of those who disagree with
such relationships.82 Limited exemptions would demonstrate that the battle
over same-sex rights need not be winner-take-all.83 Religious exemptions
could decrease opposition to same-sex relationships, resulting in more rights
for same-sex couples in states that currently refuse to recognize such rights. In
most cases, both groups can enjoy their rights without detracting from the
other.84 Thus, while exemptions would have some effect on the ability of
same-sex couples to choose their service providers, exemptions might serve as
a catalyst for recognizing new rights for same-sex couples.85
B. The Historical Precedent for Religious Exemptions
The sections below describe the historical precedent for recognizing both
statutory and constitutional religious exemptions. Recounting this history
serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that religious exemptions from
laws and government policies have been both legitimate and effective, and,
second, it serves as a reminder of the value that the United States has placed on
freedom of conscience as a component of religious freedom since
independence.86 Indeed, one might argue that the values underlying religious
exemptions are woven into the very fabric of our system of government.87
1. Historical Recognition of Statutory Exemptions
The United States has a long tradition of statutory exemptions for those
who are conscientiously opposed to specific government programs.
Exemptions for conscientious objectors to military service pre-date the
Constitution.88 The Framers considered including an Amendment in the Bill of

82 See Stern, supra note 52 (outlining the consequences of recognizing same-sex rights for religious
individuals and organizations).
83 See Vischer, supra note 22, at 84 (referring to the winner-take-all approach in the pharmacist arena).
84 One element of the strict scrutiny test outlined infra Part V would take into account whether other
sources of service are available.
85 See supra Part I.A.2 (showing that only six states recognize same-sex marriage, and less than half
provide protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
86 See WITTE, supra note 76, at xxi (referring to “liberty of conscience” as a principle of religious
freedom recognized by the founders).
87 See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 632 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
enforcement of the oath requirement at issue in the case should be viewed not only as “contrary . . . to the
specific intent of the Congress but as repugnant to the fundamental principle of representative government”).
88 See KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 49 (2006) (“[E]xcusing people from
military service remains the quintessential exemption, against which we can compare many other conflicts of
legal duty and religious conscience.”).
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Rights to protect conscientious objectors to military service but ultimately
concluded that it was a function of the states or the responsibility of Congress
to provide for such exemptions.89 Since that time, Congress has provided
exemptions for religious objectors to military service through various statutes,
including the 1864 Draft Act, the Draft Act of 1917 and the 1940 Selective
Service Act.90 The Court has played an active role in defining the scope of
these statutory exemptions91 and has also recognized, as an extension of the
exemptions from military service, an implicit exemption from the oath
requirement of the Nationality Act for immigrants who object to swearing an
oath to bear arms for the United States.92 In addition to providing exemptions
for objectors to military service, Congress has more recently provided religious
exemptions to other laws in a variety of contexts such as abortion, employment
discrimination, and taxes.93
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Exemptions
The jurisprudence surrounding the Free Exercise Clause is heavily
concerned with whether individuals should be exempt from government laws
or policies that affect the practice of their religion, and the Supreme Court has
recognized such exemptions in certain contexts.94 The Court has not, however,
directly addressed whether the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions for
89 See WITTE, supra note 76, at 81–87 (providing the text of the draft amendment and the debates
surrounding the religion clauses in general). The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether the
Constitution would provide an exemption for religious conscientious objectors to military service, but it has
indicated in dicta that it would not. See GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 59 (noting that the Court stated in
dicta in Macintosh that the Free Exercise Clause did not confer such a right to objectors absent legislation;, and
noting that the Court in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), stated that selective service objectors
did not have a constitutional right of exemption; , but also pointing out that the Court has not yet decided the
ultimate issue of whether religious objectors would enjoy an exemption derived from the Free Exercise
Clause).
90 GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 50–51.
91 Id. at 59–67. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (interpreting the phrases “religious
training and belief” and “belief in a Supreme Being” used in the Universal Military Training and Service Act);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (extending the conscientious objector exemption under the
Military Service Act to individuals whose ethical or moral beliefs prevent them from serving in the military).
92 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
93 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of exemptions involving abortion and employment discrimination.
For a description of other exemptions enacted by Congress, see Diana B. Henriques, In the Congressional
Hopper: A Long Wish List of Special Benefits and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A20.
94 See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the application of state compulsory
school-attendance laws to Amish parents violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a state’s denial of unemployment
compensation to a claimant who quit his job because it required him to participate in the production of
materials used to manufacture arms, in violation of his religious beliefs, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
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religious objectors to civil laws promoting the private rights of individuals.
The debates and drafts of the Framers have led scholars to different
conclusions as to whether the Framers intended to include in the Free Exercise
Clause a right of conscience that would allow exemptions from civil statutes.95
The evidence regarding the original intent of the Framers is inconclusive and
perhaps irrelevant since the Framers most likely did not envision the array of
civil statutes that has accompanied the growth of the modern administrative
state.96 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on free exercise claims has varied significantly over time,97 with
some of the Court’s decisions suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause could
provide exemptions from civil statutes and others suggesting the opposite. The
Court’s earliest cases suggest that the Free Exercise Clause did not
contemplate exemptions from government laws or policies.98 However, the
Court began employing a broader interpretation and applying heightened forms
of scrutiny to free exercise claims in 1940, when the clause was first applied to
the states.99
The Court’s post-1940 decisions demonstrate a concern over requiring
individuals to participate in activities that go against their religious beliefs and
a willingness to recognize exemptions from such requirements. For example,
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held that a
local board of education’s policy requiring students to either salute the flag or
face expulsion violated the First Amendment rights of students who, based on
their beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses, believed that saluting the flag would
violate the biblical commandment against worshipping a “graven image.”100
Although it is unclear whether the Court would have extended its decision in

95

See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1414–15 (1990) (arguing that the Framers contemplated religious exemptions from
statutes). But see Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (critiquing McConnell’s argument and concluding that the
evidence does not establish the Framers’ intent to provide religious exemptions from civil statutes).
96 See WITTE, supra note 76, at 163 (referring to the pluralization of religions and the proliferation of
welfare laws in the United States).
97 See id. at 146–52 (explaining the variety of approaches and levels of scrutiny that the Court has
applied to free exercise cases since 1940).
98 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (upholding the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting polygamy and noting that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices”).
99 WITTE, supra note 76 at 149.
100 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626–29 (1943).
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Barnette to other contexts,101 the decision is significant because the Court
recognized a constitutional right to refuse to participate in an activity that
violates one’s religious beliefs.102 The Court’s opinion evidences the value
placed on freedom of religious conscience and freedom of expression as means
to maintaining a free and peaceful society.103
Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court first applied strict
scrutiny to a free exercise claim,104 the Court emphasized the gravity of forcing
an individual to “choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”105 According to the Court,
this choice “puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”106
Although they are not sufficient to establish a constitutional right of
exemption for all religious objectors, cases like Barnette and Sherbert illustrate
the importance of protecting individuals from government laws or policies that
compel them to act against their religious beliefs. Even where the Court has
found that no constitutional right of exemption exists for a particular category
of religious claimants, the Court has emphasized the appropriateness of
providing statutory exemptions.107 Though the current test for free exercise
claims, set forth in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, will in most instances not recognize exemptions for religious

101 See id. at 630, 634 (emphasizing that the rule infringed on the plaintiff’s right to speak his own mind
and noting that the plaintiff’s refusal to salute the flag had little bearing on the rights of others).
102 The concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas indicates that religious claimants should be
required to act in discordance with their beliefs only in certain situations. See id. at 643–44 (Black & Douglas,
JJ., concurring) (“Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from responsibility to conduct
themselves obediently to laws which are either imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave
and pressingly imminent dangers or which, without any general prohibition, merely regulate time, place or
manner of religious activity.”).
103 See id. at 637 (majority opinion) (noting that to enforce the Bill of Rights “is not to choose weak
government over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind
in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous
end.”).
104 WITTE, supra note 76, at 149.
105 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963).
106 Id. at 404. The plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits after she lost her job because she refused
to violate her religious beliefs by working on Saturday. The Court concluded that the denial of unemployment
benefits violated her free exercise rights. Id. at 403.
107 See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (recognizing congressional power to enact protections
for a limited class of individuals who object to military service for religious reasons).
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objectors,108 the Court in Smith also recognized the role of legislatures in
providing broader protection for religious liberty.109
In short, the current battle over same-sex rights suggests the need for a
policy that can relieve the tension between same-sex rights and religious
liberty.
The historical precedents of recognizing both statutory and
constitutional exemptions for other religious objectors further demonstrate
both the importance and feasibility of providing exemptions for religious
objectors to same-sex rights.
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROVIDE EXEMPTIONS
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”110 By
requiring an individual to participate in an activity that is contrary to his or her
religious beliefs, such as the legitimization of same-sex marriage or the
establishment of a family for same-sex couples, the state is arguably requiring
the individual to affirm something that is contrary to his or her religious beliefs
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.111 Although prior to 1990, the
Supreme Court might have agreed with such a broad interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court’s current interpretation is narrower in
scope.112 Section A describes the current scope of free exercise rights under
the First Amendment. Given the limitations of First Amendment jurisprudence
in addressing the tension between same-sex marriage and the exercise of
religious conscience, sections B and C examine alternative federal and state
constitutional authority for religious exemptions, concluding that none of these
authorities sufficiently protect religious objectors.

108

See infra Part III.A.
See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting
that it is “not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental
peyote use”).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Official
compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one’s religious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom of worship.”).
112 For a more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence, see WITTE, supra note 76, at 143–69 and GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 27–34.
109
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A. The Current State of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The current test for determining whether a state action violates the Free
Exercise Clause arises out of Smith.113 The subsections below discuss: (1) the
test of “general and neutral applicability” arising out of Smith and the
subsequent applications of this standard by the Supreme Court and lower
courts; and (2) two specific state and lower court cases applying the Smith test
to contexts involving religious objectors.
1. Smith and the “General and Neutrally Applicable” Standard
In Smith, decided in 1990, the Supreme Court held that “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability.’”114 The plaintiffs in Smith had been
denied unemployment compensation because they were fired for using
peyote.115 Despite the plaintiffs’ assertion that they used the peyote in
connection with a religious ceremony of the Native American Church,116 the
Court held that the denial of unemployment compensation did not violate their
free exercise rights because the state criminal statute prohibiting the use of
peyote was a valid exercise of the police power and was of neutral and general
applicability.117 The Court did not require the state to provide a compelling
interest for the law or the absence of exemptions.118 Though the Court in
Smith stated that its decision did not overrule prior cases, the result and the test
applied in Smith diverged from prior unemployment compensation cases.119
The Court in Smith did not do away with the strict scrutiny test altogether
but instead cabined the application of strict scrutiny to laws that are either not
113

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 879.
115 Id. at 874.
116 Id. at 874, 876.
117 Id. at 882.
118 Id. at 885. For an example of how the Court has applied the compelling interest standard in the
context of free exercise, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–09 (1963). The Court found that no
compelling state interest supported the government’s denial of unemployment compensation to the plaintiff,
who was discharged from her employment because, in accordance with her religious beliefs, she refused to
work on Saturday. In determining whether there was a compelling state interest, the Court noted, “in this
highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion
for permissible limitation.’” Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
119 Compare Smith, with Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Sherbert, 374
U.S. 398; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In the three latter cases,
the Court found that denial of unemployment compensation to individuals who were unemployed because of
their religious objections to work duties violated the Free Exercise Clause.
114
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neutral or not generally applicable.120 While the post-Smith analysis for free
exercise claims therefore turns on the threshold issue of whether a law is
neutral and generally applicable, the application of this standard by the
Supreme Court and lower courts has yielded conflicting results. In Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court, applying
the Smith test, struck down the application of a Florida ordinance that
prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals.121 The Court indicated that the
process of determining whether a law is of general and neutral applicability
extends beyond the strict language of the statute, noting that although the
Florida animal cruelty statute at issue seemed neutral on its face, the state
applied the statute to allow almost all types of animal slaughter except ritual
animal sacrifice.122 Because the application of the statute “singled out”
religious practice, the statute was not general and neutrally applicable.123 The
Court therefore applied strict scrutiny and held that Florida’s interest in
protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals could have been
addressed through less restrictive means such as regulations regarding disposal
of organic waste.124
While the Court in Lukumi appeared to clarify the standard for free exercise
claims, ten years later, in Locke v. Davey, the Court confused the standard by
holding that a Washington state statute, which explicitly excluded students
pursuing a “degree in theology” from the state’s honor scholarship program,
did not require strict scrutiny.125 The Court contrasted this provision with the
statute at issue in Lukumi, arguing that “[i]n the present case, the State’s
disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes
neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or
rite . . . . The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction.”126 Having found no presumption against the constitutionality of
the statute, the Court upheld the Washington law.127 Justice Scalia, who
authored the majority opinion in Smith, dissented, arguing that the majority in

120 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538–39 (1993) (applying
strict scrutiny where the law was applied in a discriminatory manner).
121 Id.
122 See id. at 537 (noting that hunting, euthanasia, and pest control were allowed).
123 Id. at 538.
124 Id. at 538–39.
125 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715–16 (2004).
126 Id. at 720–21.
127 Id. at 725.
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Locke departed from precedent by endorsing a “public benefits program that
facially discriminates against religion.”128
The vague definition of general and neutral applicability offered by the
Supreme Court has also led to varied interpretations by lower courts. In
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania129 and Falwell v. Miller,130 the courts found that
the statutes at issue were not neutral and generally applicable, and thus were
subject to strict scrutiny. The state constitutional provision at issue in Falwell
was found to be neither neutral nor generally applicable because on its face it
discriminated against churches by providing that churches could not
incorporate under state law.131 In Blackhawk, the court found the statute
neutral on its face but said the law was applied in a non-neutral way that
discriminated against religious individuals.132 In each case, the court held that
the statute failed to satisfy strict scrutiny and therefore violated the Free
Exercise Clause.133 In contrast to Falwell and Blackhawk, in Wirzberger v.
Galvin, the First Circuit found that a Massachusetts constitutional provision
barring initiative amendments to the state constitution related to “religion,
religious practices or religious institutions”134 did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.135 The court provided only a brief analysis of the plaintiffs’ free
exercise claims, offering several reasons for upholding the statute136 but failing
to explain why a statute that specifically singles out initiatives related to
“religion, religious practices or religious institutions” should be considered
neutral and generally applicable.137
Cases such as Locke, Lukumi, Blackhawk, and Wirzburger demonstrate that
through its decision in Smith, the Court has not only reduced the general
128

Id. at 726 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).
130 203 F. Supp. 2d 624 (W.D. Va. 2002).
131 Id. at 628, 630–31.
132 Blackhawk, 381 F.3d at 209.
133 See id. at 214 (noting that even if the state had a compelling interest, the application of the statute was
not the least restrictive means of promoting that interest); Falwell, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 632 (holding that since
the state did not offer a compelling interest, the provision failed the strict scrutiny test).
134 Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt.
2, §2).
135 Id. at 282.
136 See id. at 280–82 (concluding that the provision at issue did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because it did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ freedom of religious belief; did not distinguish among particular
religious groups or affiliations, and instead applied equally to all initiatives bearing any relation to religion and
to all citizens regardless of their religious beliefs; did not prohibit religious conduct or religious practices; and
was not motivated by religious animus).
137 Id. at 275 (citing MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, §2).
129
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standard for free exercise cases from one of strict scrutiny to one of general
and neutral applicability, it has also failed to articulate a clear test for
determining general and neutral applicability. The Court’s current standard
thus offers little protection or predictability for free exercise claimants. The
section below attempts to define the scope of protection that the Smith standard
provides for religious objectors in particular, concluding that while the Free
Exercise Clause might still offer some protection for religious objectors, it is
severely limited and is unlikely to arise in the context of laws establishing
same-sex rights.
2. Application of the Smith Standard in Religious Objector Cases
Two cases illustrate the limited scope of protection available to religious
objectors under the Free Exercise Clause. The first, Stormans, Inc. v.
Selecky,138 which arose in the context of pharmacists’ objections to dispensing
oral contraceptives, shows that the Smith standard may protect religious
objectors from liability when the primary intent of the statute is to restrict the
rights of religious objectors, but such an intent can be difficult to prove. North
Coast, the second case (already discussed in the Introduction), illustrates the
failure of the Smith standard to protect religious objectors from liability under
civil statutes that give rights to same-sex couples.
a. Stormans: Legislative Intent to Restrict Religious Objectors
Over the past few years, a number of states have passed laws allowing
pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions for oral contraceptives because of
religious or moral objections.139 In 2006, Washington’s state Board of
Pharmacy issued proposed rules addressing, among other things, pharmacists’
refusal to dispense lawfully prescribed medication.140 After receiving public
comments, the Board adopted new regulations in 2007 that required
pharmacies to fill all lawful prescriptions.141 The regulations exempt
138

571 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2009).
For an overview of state legislation regarding the rights and duties of pharmacists, see NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE CLAUSES: LAWS AND LEGISLATION (2009),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/ConscienceClauses.htm.
140 Stormans, 571 F.3d at 964. According to the district court, one of the early proposals would have
allowed state-licensed pharmacists to refuse to dispense medication as long as the pharmacy or pharmacist did
not “obstruct a patient’s effort to obtain lawfully prescribed drugs or devices.” Stormans v. Selecky, 524 F.
Supp. 2d 1245, 1250–51 (W.D. Wash. 2007), rev’d, 571 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2009).
141 Stormans, 571 F.3d at 965–66. A statement accompanying the regulations said that a pharmacy may
accommodate an individual pharmacist’s religious or moral objections, but the pharmacy itself may not refuse
139
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pharmacies from filling prescriptions for certain reasons, such as lack of
payment, suspicion that the prescription is fraudulent, lack of necessary
equipment, or unavailability; but the regulations do not provide an exemption
for religious objectors.142 In response, a group of pharmacists filed for a
preliminary injunction, alleging that the regulations violated their right to free
exercise under the U.S. Constitution.143
The district court decision in Stormans v. Selecky and the Ninth Circuit’s
later reversal of that decision show that it will be difficult for religious
objectors to claim that a civil statute or regulation is anything but neutral and
generally applicable. The district court applied the Smith analysis to enjoin
Washington’s “duty to fill” requirement,144 on the ground that there was
sufficient evidence that the newly imposed rule was not a valid law of neutral
and general applicability.145 Rather, it was passed to limit the free exercise
rights of pharmacists by requiring them to act contrary to their religious
beliefs.146
The district court noted that the regulations were facially neutral, applying
to all pharmacists and all types of medication,147 but it looked beyond the plain
language of the rule in evaluating whether it was neutral and generally
applicable. Based on the history behind the rule and the news releases
referring to complaints about pharmacists who refused to fill emergency
contraceptives the court concluded that the evidence “strongly suggests that the
overriding objective of the subject regulations was, to the degree possible, to
eliminate moral and religious objections from the business of dispensing
medication.”148 The court further determined that the regulations were not
generally applicable, noting, “[f]rom the very beginning of this issue, it
appears that the focus of the debate has been on Plan B and on religious

to dispense the medication. Id. at 966–67. Individual pharmacist plaintiffs, however, claimed that the absence
of a moral or religious exemption for pharmacies would cause them to quit or lose their jobs. Id. at 967.
142 Id. at 966 n.5.
143 Id. at 1255.
144 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. For a discussion of the debate over pharmacist refusal clauses, see
Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses
for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469 (2006), and for a discussion of the rights and obligations at issue in
“duty to fill” laws, see Norey, supra note 64.
145 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1259–62.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1257.
148 Id. at 1259.
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objection to dispensing that drug.”149 Finally, the court noted that there was no
evidence that any individual in the State of Washington had been unable to
obtain an emergency contraceptive because of a pharmacist’s refusal to
dispense the medication,150 ultimately concluding that the evidence did not
support the state’s contention that the regulations advanced a compelling state
interest and were narrowly tailored for that purpose.151
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion, on the ground that
the legal standard for preliminary injunctions had changed since the district
court issued its opinion. The Ninth Circuit further held that the district court
erred in finding that the regulations were not neutral and generally
applicable.152 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court should not have
considered the legislative history of the challenged regulation. It noted that the
district court relied on the Lukumi decision in its consideration of legislative
history, but only Justices Kennedy and Stevens joined the portion of the
Lukumi opinion discussing legislative history.153
The analysis of the district court in Stormans cautions states against
intentionally limiting the free exercise of religious individuals and
organizations in favor of other groups or classes.154 However, the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion shows that religious objectors are unlikely to succeed in
challenging the constitutionality of such state laws.. One might question the
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that legislative history may not be incorporated into
a free exercise analysis,155 but the court’s decision highlights an important
point—unless courts can point to legislative history evidencing a clear intent to
limit free exercise of religion, most civil statutes and regulations will be
deemed a neutral and generally applicable law, subject only to rational basis
scrutiny under Smith. Whether it is because courts are unwilling to review
legislative history or because that legislative history does not evidence a clear
intent to prohibit free exercise, most civil statutes will be deemed neutral and
149 Id. at 1260. For a description of Plan B, a hormonal emergency contraceptive, see Stormans v.
Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2009).
150 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
151 Id. at 1264. Because the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, the court
granted a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1266.
152 Stormans, 571 F.3d at 977–79.
153 Id. at 981–82.
154 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (noting that the policy was not neutral when enacted with the
objective of preventing pharmacists from exercising their rights of conscience).
155 The court itself notes, “[w]e may discern with certainty only that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas did not join Part II.A.2 of the opinion due to disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s use of
legislative history.” Stormans, 571 F.3d at 982 n.13.
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generally applicable unless applied in a discriminatory manner. North Coast
illustrates this point in the context of civil laws affording rights to same-sex
couples.
b. North Coast: Civil Rights Statutes and Religious Objectors
While the decision in Stormans shows that the Free Exercise Clause might
still place some limits on state actions that compel professionals to perform
duties contrary to their religious beliefs, the decision in North Coast
demonstrates the inadequacy of the Smith test to resolve most of the conflicts
that arise between laws protecting same-sex couples and the freedom of
religious objectors. Recall that in North Coast, a lesbian woman brought suit
against two doctors at a fertility clinic who refused to perform IUI for her
because doing so would have violated their religious beliefs.156 The plaintiff
claimed that the doctors violated her rights under California’s civil rights
statute, and the doctors raised defenses of free exercise under the federal and
state constitutions. Applying the Smith test, the California Supreme Court held
that the Unruh Civil Rights Act is a valid law of neutral and general
applicability.157 It therefore, found that the application of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act did not violate the defendants’ right of free exercise. As a result, if
the defendants’ refusal to perform IUI for the plaintiff was based on the
plaintiff’s sexual orientation,158 the defendants violated the civil rights statute
and are therefore liable to the plaintiff.159 The opinion in North Coast
demonstrates that, in applying the Smith test, courts are not likely to find that
the Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from laws that were passed to
protect the rights of a separate class of individuals rather than to explicitly
prevent the religious or free exercise rights of another class of individuals.160
156 For an in-depth discussion of the legal rights and duties implicated in the newly emerging field of
Artificial Reproductive Technology, including IUI, see Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies:
Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18 (2008).
157 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 966 (Cal.
2008). The court’s analysis is brief in comparison to the analysis performed in most of the other cases
referenced in this Part.
158 The defendants maintained that their refusal to perform IUI for the plaintiff was based on her marital
status rather than her sexual orientation. The trial court determined that there was a dispute of material fact on
this issue that must be resolved at trial. Thus, the issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the
defendants could assert a valid First Amendment defense if their actions were based on plaintiff’s sexual
orientation. Id. at 963, 970.
159 Id. at 970.
160 Although North Coast involved a statutory right, there is no reason to suspect that courts would apply
a different analysis where there is a state constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples. The one
distinction is that when bringing a constitutional claim, a plaintiff might be required to show that the private
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As long as legislative history emphasizes the rights of the protected group
rather than targeting religious objectors, the law will be viewed as neutral and
generally applicable.
B. The Limited Promise of Other U.S. Constitutional Provisions
In the wake of Smith, plaintiffs might invoke other constitutional provisions
to protect religious conduct. These other provisions may be used in one of two
ways, neither of which offers much promise for religious objectors. The first is
by pairing a free exercise claim with a claim under another constitutional
provision. The Court in Smith suggested that even where the law at issue is
neutral and generally applicable, such “hybrid rights” might justify a higher
level of scrutiny than that applied to a free exercise claim alone.161 The scope
of this protection is limited, however, because lower federal courts have been
hesitant to recognize the existence of other constitutional rights in free exercise
cases unless these other constitutional rights are obviously implicated. No
such correlative right is obvious in the case of religious objectors who refuse to
serve same-sex couples.162
Rather than pairing another constitutional right with a free exercise right,
claimants may choose to invoke an alternative provision of the Constitution
that would require the court to apply a higher level of scrutiny. The Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are two potential sources, but
neither offers a ready solution for religious objectors. At least one scholar has
argued that the Court should recognize a general right of conscience under the
Due Process Clause that would require courts to balance claims of competing
interests such as those arising in the context of same-sex marriage.163 While
individual or organization alleged to have engaged in discrimination is a state actor. While it is doubtful that
the plaintiff in North Coast could have established that the doctors were state actors, the question of whether
clergy members are state actors in performing or refusing to perform marriages is a much closer issue because
they are licensed by the state to solemnize marriages. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the
Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion, in EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 20, at 103,
113–16.
161 See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved . . . the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”).
162 See, e.g., id. (noting that although a hybrid of constitutional rights may raise the level of scrutiny, no
other constitutional rights were at issue in the case); North Coast, 189 P.3d at 967 (rejecting defendants’
claims that their refusal to perform IUI was grounded in both free speech and free exercise rights under the
First Amendment).
163 See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note
20, at 123, 138 (arguing for a right of conscience under the Due Process Clause).
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this approach would serve as an effective way of resolving conflicts between
the right to same-sex marriage and the right to free exercise, it would require a
significant reformulation of the Court’s due process jurisprudence.164 It seems
unlikely that the Court would be willing to expand the scope of the Due
Process Clause to engage in a balancing test that it was unwilling to recognize
under the First Amendment. A claimant could bring a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause,165 arguing either (1) that the law at issue discriminates
against a protected class on its face or in application, and therefore requires
strict scrutiny, or (2) that the law lacks a rational basis and is therefore
unconstitutional.166
However, if the allegation is that the provision
discriminates on the basis of religion, the analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause will generally mirror the analysis under the neutral and general
applicability test of Smith in that both tests would apply rational basis scrutiny
to a law that is neutral on its face and in application, and both would apply
strict scrutiny to a law that discriminates against religion.167 Thus, like Smith,
the Equal Protection Clause will almost always warrant rational basis review
for civil laws protecting same-sex couples like the civil rights statute in North
Coast.
C. State Constitutional Interpretations: An Ineffective Solution
As demonstrated below, in several states, courts have recognized that the
free exercise clause—or its equivalent—in the state constitution provides
greater protection to religious claimants than the First Amendment. While it is
notable that some states provide greater constitutional protection for the free
exercise of religion than the protection afforded under the First Amendment
since Smith, in practice the application of heightened scrutiny does not
automatically yield different outcomes for free exercise claimants. For
example, in Rupert v. City of Portland, the Supreme Court of Maine subjected
164 For an overview of fundamental rights recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, see CHEMERINSKY supra, note 35 at 791–919.
165 See Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 467 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (addressing claims under the
Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Equal Protection Clause).
166 For a basic overview of the appropriate analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, see CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 35, at 669–74.
167 The one distinction between the two tests arises where courts require the plaintiff to show a substantial
burden before implementing the Smith analysis. In these instances, a claimant might win under equal
protection but not under free exercise. See Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of
Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987–88 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding an equal protection violation but rejecting
plaintiff’s free exercise claim where a zoning ordinance was applied to religious organizations in a different
manner). The court in Vineyard notes the oddity of this result. Id.
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a seizure of drug paraphernalia to strict scrutiny under the state free exercise
clause.168 The court ultimately upheld the seizure, finding that it served a
compelling government interest and was the least restrictive means
available.169 Similarly, courts in Washington have recognized that the free
exercise clause of the Washington Constitution affords more protection than
the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.170 However, as the Supreme
Court of Maine found in Rupert, the Washington court in State v. Balzer found
that the state law prohibiting possession of marijuana satisfied a compelling
government interest and was the least restrictive means for promoting that
interest.171 The court, therefore, held that there was no free exercise
violation.172
The free exercise claims of those who object to same-sex marriage are
analogous to the free exercise claims brought by landlords who refuse to rent
to unmarried heterosexual couples. Even in states that apply the same or
similar forms of heightened scrutiny, landlords have encountered mixed results
in court. The supreme court of at least one state, Minnesota, has held that a
landlord’s refusal to rent to an unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual couple did
not violate the couple’s rights and was protected under the state constitution.173
Although State v. French demonstrates that state constitutional provisions may
protect religious objectors, the reasoning of the court in that case may not
necessarily apply to a situation involving discrimination against same-sex
couples. Because Minnesota law prohibited fornication, the state supreme
court reasoned that the legislature could not have intended to include
unmarried, cohabiting couples within the definition of “marital status” under
the state antidiscrimination statute, and thus the state did not have a compelling
interest in prohibiting discrimination against such couples.174 However,
French was decided in 1990, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision thirteen
years later in Lawrence has eradicated any analogous argument regarding
cohabitation of same-sex couples.175

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 1992).
Id.
State v. Balzer, 954 P.2d 931, 935–36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 940–42.
State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 7–9 (Minn. 1990).
Id.
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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Further, the French decision stands in contrast to the holdings in similar
cases in other states. For example, courts in Alaska176 and California177 have
held that landlords cannot claim a religious exemption from state housing
statutes even if the state constitution requires application of a higher level of
scrutiny than the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of California found
that an antidiscrimination provision of a state housing statute did not burden
the landlord’s free exercise rights because the landlord’s religion did not
require her to rent out apartments.178 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alaska
held that although the state’s anti-discrimination law did burden the landlord’s
free exercise rights, the state had a compelling interest in prohibiting housing
discrimination against unmarried cohabiting couples.179 Other states have
similarly held that whether an antidiscrimination provision of a state housing
law violates the free exercise rights of landlords depends on whether the state
can establish a compelling interest for the antidiscrimination provision.180
North Coast further illustrates that applying heightened scrutiny to free
exercise claims under a state constitution will not guarantee a victory for
religious objectors. In addition to dismissing the defendants’ First Amendment
defense, the court in North Coast determined that the defendants had no valid
defense under the California Constitution.181 The court concluded that even if
strict scrutiny were to apply to cases arising under the state constitution, the
state still had a compelling interest in “ensuring full and equal access to
medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation,” and the Unruh Civil
Rights Act provided the least restrictive means of accomplishing that goal.182
This holding regarding the California Constitution is significant when
examining the most effective channels for enhancing protection of religious
objectors to same-sex relationships. The court’s opinion demonstrates the
state’s ability to circumvent efforts to protect religious objectors through
176

Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
178 Smith, 913 P.2d at 929, 931 (holding that even if the state constitution required a higher level of
scrutiny than the U.S. Constitution, the landlord would have no valid objection because the higher level of
scrutiny would be the same scrutiny applied under RFRA, and under that standard the landlord still could not
demonstrate a burden on free exercise).
179 Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281–84.
180 Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 459 Mich. 1235 (Mich.
1999).
181 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 968 (Cal.
2008).
182 Id. The court failed to provide a detailed analysis of the narrow tailoring prong, concluding rather
summarily that the statute is the least restrictive means available.
177
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statutes that merely raise the level of scrutiny applied to all categories of free
exercise claims.183 Even where a higher level of scrutiny applies, the court
may find that the state has a compelling interest in preserving the right to
same-sex marriage or prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.184 For this reason, laws such as RLUIPA, discussed below, which
target specific activities or categories of claimants, might be more successful in
protecting the conscience rights of religious claimants.
IV. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: THE RANGE OF STATUTORY
RESPONSES TO SMITH
Federal and state responses to Smith illustrate the varied ways to extend
greater statutory protections to religious objectors. Although the Court in
Smith was unsympathetic to the claimants’ argument that their First
Amendment rights had been violated, the Court made it clear that states and
Congress are free to go beyond the minimal requirements of the U.S.
Constitution and provide greater protection for the religious freedom of
individuals.185 These protections are generally found in: (1) statute-specific
exemptions for religious objectors; (2) state or federal laws that effectively
require the application of strict scrutiny to burdens on free exercise; and (3)
RLUIPA, which raises the level of scrutiny for two specific types of claims—
those made by prisoners against state and federal governments, and those
regarding land use regulations.
A. Statute-Specific Exemptions
As noted in Smith, several states recognized statutory exemptions to state
controlled substance laws prior to the Court’s decision.186 After Smith, other
states passed laws exempting the use of peyote in religious ceremonies from
state bans on controlled substances.187 For example, Oregon law now
explicitly provides for an affirmative defense where peyote is used in the

183 See id. (arguing that even if a higher level of scrutiny applies under the state constitution, the
defendants’ free exercise claims would still fail).
184 See id.
185 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
186 See id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3402(B)(1)–(3) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-317(3)
(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (West 1989)).
187 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.840 (West Supp. 2009).
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practice of a religious belief in a manner that is not dangerous to the user or
others in close proximity.188
As demonstrated in the discussion above regarding the history of religious
conscience rights, the recognition of explicit statutory exemptions from certain
laws is not a recent phenomenon.189 In addition to the statutory exemptions for
conscientious objectors to military service and oath-swearing mentioned
above, Congress and the states have provided exemptions to many other types
of statutory and constitutional rights, including civil rights statutes and the
judicially recognized rights to abortion and contraception. Churches and other
religious organizations generally enjoy certain exemptions from employment
discrimination laws.190 For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides that religious organizations may use religious criteria in hiring.
Courts also have recognized a further implicit exemption from discrimination
laws known as the “ministerial exception,” which applies in cases that involve
the hiring and firing of clergy.191
The examples of exemption legislation most relevant to the conflict
addressed here are federal and state “conscience clauses” that protect doctors
who refuse to perform abortions and sterilization procedures and pharmacists
who refuse to dispense contraceptives.192 For example, federal legislation,
commonly referred to as the Church Amendment, prohibits federal funding of
hospitals that require doctors to perform an abortion over religious
objections.193 These state and federal conscience clauses do not currently
provide protection for religious objectors to statutes that grant rights to samesex couples. However, because the vast majority of such state statutes target
specific procedures like abortion or sterilization, it is unlikely they can be
invoked to address objections outside of the health care context.194 Some
states have recently sought to extend these protections to pharmacists, but this
issue remains controversial.195 As noted earlier, New Hampshire, Maine, and
Vermont provide that churches and members of the clergy are not required to
188

Id.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of statutory exemptions in the U.S.). See also
GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 50.
190 Id. at 382–84.
191 Id.
192 See Wilson, supra note 20, app. at 299 (providing excerpts from state conscience clauses).
193 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7 (2006)
194 See Wilson, supra note 20, app. at 299.
195 See supra Part II.A.2.a (describing the controversy that erupted in the state of Washington over
pharmacists’ rights to refuse to dispense Plan B).
189
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participate in same-sex marriage ceremonies, but in Maine and Vermont these
exemptions do not extend to other activities or other types of religious
objectors.196 It is not clear how far New Hampshire’s protections extend.
Although these protections do cover housing and services related to the
marriage ceremony, they may or may not cover services like adoption and
fertility treatments.197
Thus far, no federal law extends protections similar to those of the Church
Amendment to other contexts. The outgoing administration of President
George W. Bush issued a regulation denying federal funding to health care
facilities that refuse to protect employees’ rights of conscience.198 The
regulation is intended to protect doctors, nurses, and other workers who do not
wish to participate in procedures that go against their moral or religious
beliefs.199 This was the first rule issued by the federal government that could
potentially protect health care providers like the doctors in North Coast, and it
sparked controversy that led some members of Congress to consider passing a
statute to override it.200 A statute may prove unnecessary since President
Barack Obama’s administration has issued a proposal to rescind the Bush
regulation.201
The controversy surrounding the Bush regulation highlights two potential
problems. The first is characteristic of using regulations, as opposed to
statutes, to provide rights in general, and the second arises from the content of
this particular regulation. First, executive orders and regulations can be
overridden by legislation or easily rescinded by subsequent administrations.202
Second, those seeking to overturn the regulation argue that it will pose barriers
to healthcare and will prevent patients from receiving the care they want and
196

See supra Part III.A.3.
2009-61 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 2 (LexisNexis) (referring to “services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges” related to “the solemnization of a marriage, the
celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage”).
198 Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or
Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88); see also Rob Stein, Rule Shields Health Workers Who Withhold Care Based on
Beliefs, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2008, at A10 (describing the regulation and the associated controversy).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Rescission of the Regulation Entitled, “Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services
Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law,” 74 Fed.
Reg. 10207 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
202 See id. (proposing to rescind the Bush regulation only a few months after its implementation); see also
Stein supra note 198 (discussing the efforts of various members of Congress to pass legislation that would
trump the regulation).
197
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need.203 This latter issue could be addressed by including a clause requiring
workers to act against their beliefs only in emergency situations where no one
else could perform the necessary task.204 This consideration could be factored
into the narrow tailoring portion of a scrutiny analysis such as the one
proposed in Part V. The consideration of alternatives might spur health care
facilities to implement protocols for ensuring that in non-emergency situations,
if there is another worker who can perform the procedure, then that worker
performs the procedure instead.
B. Federal and State RFRAs (Applying Strict Scrutiny Across the Board)
In response to Smith, Congress and the states sought to implement a
statutory scheme that would subject state and federal government actions that
burden free exercise to strict scrutiny. This movement began in 1993, when
Congress passed RFRA.205 The law sought to replace the rational basis
standard for laws of general and neutral applicability announced in Smith with
a strict scrutiny standard.206 The subsections below reveal that the success of
RFRA in its application to the states was short-lived. The current patchwork
of state RFRAs is not certain to offer protection for religious objectors either.
1. The Failure of the Federal RFRA
Congress relied entirely on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to pass RFRA.207 In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states
because Congress lacked the authority to pass the statute under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.208

203

Id.
See Wilson, supra note 20, app. at 310 (referring to state legislation that limits exemptions to nonemergency situations).
205 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
206 Michael Paisner, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores and the
Scope of Congress’s Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 540 (2005).
207 Some scholars have argued that Congress could have relied on other powers instead of, or in addition
to, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 575, 576 (1998) (“A constitutional strategy that diversified the underpinnings of RFRA was
available and far preferable to what was used; stools always stand better on three or more legs than on one.”).
208 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
204
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In retrospect, the Court’s decision in Boerne was not as devastating to the
cause of religious liberty as one might think.209 A review of federal
regulations and state attorney general decisions during the three-and-a-halfyear period between the Act’s passage and the Boerne decision demonstrates
that RFRA had little impact on religious liberty issues.210 In a few cases,
claimants achieved victories that they would not otherwise have secured under
the First Amendment, but most of the cases brought under RFRA were
unsuccessful.211 During this period, RFRA seems to have enjoyed the most
success in cases brought by prisoners, but “even there RFRA probably did not
create any dramatic alteration in the climate of relations between inmates and
administrators on matters of religious liberty.”212
Ira Lupu, who has examined the application of RFRA to states before
Boerne, has offered various explanations for the failure of RFRA. These range
from the reluctance of courts to grant religious exemptions213 to the reliance by
courts on the disjointed pre-Smith case law regarding burdens and interests in
the context of free exercise cases.214 Courts interpreted the language requiring
a “substantial burden” on religion in a way that “placed the bar very high for
RFRA claimants.”215 Many of the RFRA claims decided on the merits were
unsuccessful because the court found there was no “substantial burden” on
religion.216 In cases where the courts did find a substantial burden, the courts
also found a compelling government interest and then used a relatively lax
standard for determining whether the state used the least restrictive means for
accomplishing its stated compelling interest.217 “Rather than ask whether the
state’s means were least restrictive . . . some courts asked whether the
alternative, less religion-restrictive means were so expensive, cumbersome, or
inconvenient that the state could not reasonably be expected to use them.”218
209 See Lupu, supra note 207, at 585 (concluding that between passage of RFRA and the Court’s decision
in Boerne, “RFRA failed to produce any substantial improvement in the legal atmosphere surrounding
religious liberty in the United States”).
210 Id. at 588–90.
211 See id. at 591 (noting that “143 of the 168 [claims brought by prisoners] produced denials of relief,
only twenty-five claims produced grants of relief (for an overall win percentage of 15% of cases decided on
the merits), and . . . nine of these twenty-five were in prisoner litigation, which typically involved the most
basic infringements of religious liberty”).
212 Id. at 585.
213 Id. at 593 (“Courts seem especially uncomfortable with claims of religious exemption.”).
214 Id. at 594.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 596.
218 Id.
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2. The Limited Success of State RFRAs
After the Court ruled RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states,
several states passed their own versions of the law. At least thirteen states
have adopted an analogous state statute or constitutional provision that
effectively applies strict scrutiny to state burdens on the free exercise of
religion.219 The text of these provisions varies slightly from state to state, but
every version contains a provision similar to this one: “Government may
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person is both (1) in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest [and] (2) the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”220 Thus, all state RFRA
statutes effectively require the application of strict scrutiny in at least some
instances where religious exercise is burdened.221
The most significant distinctions among state statutes relate to the terms
and definitions used to describe the type of activity protected and the level of
burden the claimant must show for strict scrutiny to apply. State statutes refer
to the category of protected religious activity using one of the following three
terms: “religious exercise,”222 “exercise of religion,”223 or “free exercise of
religion.”224 While these terms are generally synonymous, and indeed are
similarly defined, slight variations among definitions could conceivably impact
the outcome of litigation. Some states do not define the relevant term at all.225

219 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52571b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401–404 (2009); 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1–99 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.3 (West Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-22 (West 2009); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–
2407 (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60 (2005);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110 (Vernon 2005).
220 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(C) (2004).
221 For an example of the application of strict scrutiny to free exercise claims, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). Some statutes clarify that the strict scrutiny test applies even to rules of general applicability,
thus distinguishing the statutory test from the Smith test. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302(1) (West Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West
2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 253(A) (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-32-40 (2005).
222 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01.
223 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005).
224 E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §1.302(1) (West Supp. 2009); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West Supp.
2009).
225 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1
(2006).
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Others define the term in accordance with the U.S. or state constitution.226
Florida defines “exercise of religion” as “an act or refusal to act that is
substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the religious
exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.”227
Similar definitions are found in other states.228 New Mexico employs similar
language but without the statement regarding centrality to a larger system of
religious belief.229
Similar variations exist with respect to the burden requirement. Some
states require a “substantial burden” on free exercise,230 while others require
merely a “burden.”231 Further, among the states that require a “substantial
burden,” the precise definition varies. Some states choose not to define the
term at all,232 and a few explicitly define “burden” or “substantial burden” as to
“inhibit” or “curtail” religious activity.233 Pennsylvania lists four acts that may
constitute a substantial burden.234 A few states note that the adjective
“substantial” is included merely to prevent trivial claims, thereby setting the
bar for demonstrating the required level of burden relatively low.235
The compelling interest test under RFRA is designed to apply to all claims,
but some states have more specific provisions for certain categories, such as
claims by prisoners,236 or provide that certain claims are not covered by the

226 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 252(2) (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West Supp. 2009);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-20(2) (2005).
227 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.02(3) (West 2005).
228 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(2) (2009); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/5 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. 1.302(2) (West Supp. 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 110.001(a)(1) (Vernon 2005).
229 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-2(A) (West 2009).
230 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(C) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03(1) (West 2005);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(5) (2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 132-40 (2005).
231 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005); see also N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-80.1-3 (2006) (using the term “restrict” instead of
“burden”).
232 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 761.03(1) (West 2005); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2005).
233 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(5) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 252(7) (West 2008).
234 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West Supp. 2009).
235 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(E) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(5) (2009).
236 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 254 (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2405(g) (West Supp.
2009).
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statute at all.237 For example, under Texas law the statute cannot serve as a
defense to violations of a federal or state civil rights law.238
Because state RFRAs were enacted relatively recently, their future
effectiveness is uncertain. However, in at least some cases where courts have
reached the merits, it appears that the same methods of interpretation that
thwarted the intent of the federal RFRA have also surfaced. For the same
reasons that higher levels of protection under state constitutions do not always
lead to greater protection for religious objectors,239 state RFRA statutes may
not provide any more protection for religious objectors than federal or state
constitutional claims. As with the federal RFRA, courts have used the
“substantial burden” requirement to narrow the scope of state statutes.240
Further, even where a court finds a substantial burden on religious exercise, the
court may also find that the state action at issue survives strict scrutiny because
the state has a compelling interest related to its action, and that action is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.241 These results may be
explained by the fact that courts have looked to prior interpretations of the
federal RFRA as a guide for interpreting state versions of the law. Even where
state and federal law differ in important ways—such as the inclusion of a
definition for “religious exercise” or “substantial burden”—these state statutes
may not yield a result different from the federal RFRA.242

237 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.307(3) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that the statute cannot be used as a
defense in personal injury cases, cases where a defendant is charged with possession of a weapon, or cases
where a defendant is charged with the failure to provide child support or health care for a child’s lifethreatening condition); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2406(b) (West Supp. 2009) (listing exceptions not covered
by the statute, including criminal defense, health and safety, and reporting of abuse).
238 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.011(a) (Vernon 2005).
239 See supra Part III.C.
240 See, e.g., Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 420 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2005); Seidman v. Paradise Valley
Unified Sch. Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1118 (D. Ariz. 2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ free exercise claims under the U.S. Constitution and state law, after
finding that the plaintiffs “failed to show a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion” where they
were required to remove a reference to “God” from an inscription in honor of their daughter that was to appear
on wall tiles in a public school).
241 See State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1010 (Ariz. 2009) (rejecting a defendant’s free exercise claim
under Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act and holding that “there is no less restrictive alternative that
would serve the State’s compelling public safety interests and still excuse the conduct [possession of
marijuana] for which Hardesty was tried and convicted.”).
242 See Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99, 101–02 (Ok. Civ. App. 2003) (finding that a plaintiff failed to
show that the state substantially burdened his religion even where the state statute at issue provided a relatively
narrow definition of substantial burden). The statute at issue in Steele defined “substantially burden” as “to
inhibit or curtail religiously motivated practice.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 252(7) (West 2008).
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C. The RLUIPA and the Prospect of Issue-Specific Federal Statutes
Though the Court struck down the federal RFRA as applied to the states,
the current success of RLUIPA demonstrates that Congress may still have the
power to pass a statute that would raise the level of scrutiny applied to claims
by religious objectors. Following the demise of RFRA as applied to the states,
Congress began to develop a narrower federal statute that could withstand a
constitutional challenge. Instead of relying solely on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as Congress had done with respect to RFRA,
Congress harnessed powers from the Spending and Commerce Clauses to
enact RLUIPA.243 Because a sweeping statute applying to all free exercise
claims would be too reminiscent of RFRA, Congress chose to focus on two
specific areas where the rights of individuals and religious organizations have
traditionally been curtailed by the states—the free exercise rights of prisoners
and the land use rights of churches and religious organizations.244
Although both statutes require the application of strict scrutiny, RFRA
applies only to certain categories of claims. In addition, RLUIPA defines
certain terms that were initially undefined under RFRA. The first section of
RLUIPA applies to land use regulations,245 and the second section applies to
institutionalized persons.246
Both sections prohibit governments from
“impos[ing] a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person,” unless
the government can show that imposition of the burden is “in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”247 For both land use
regulations and institutionalized persons, the statute applies where the burden
is in relation to programs or activities that receive federal funding and where it
affects—or would affect if removed—interstate or foreign commerce.248
Unlike some state RFRAs, the statute does not define “substantial burden.”
Instead, Congress relied on the courts to employ pre-Smith free exercise

243

See generally 42 USC §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5.
Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2005).
245 42 USC § 2000cc.
246 42 USC §§ 2000cc-1.
247 42 USC §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(3)(a). In the case of land use regulations “person” includes a
religious assembly or institution. 42 USC §§ 2000cc(a)(1).
248 42 USC §§ 2000cc(a)(2), 2000cc-1(3)(b). These jurisdictional elements relate to Congress’s authority
to enact legislation under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.
244
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jurisprudence to determine whether a substantial burden truly exists.249
Though it does not define substantial burden, RLUIPA defines “religious
exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief,”250 and further clarifies that “the use, building,
or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise” is
considered religious exercise of the person or entity that seeks to use the
property for that purpose.251 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
government action has substantially burdened free exercise, but once this is
achieved, the burden shifts to the government to prove that it has used the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.252 The Act
further requires that courts construe the language of the statute “in favor of a
broad protection of religious exercise.”253
Although the language of RLUIPA is similar to state and federal RFRA
statutes, during RLUIPA’s first few years of operation, claimants seem to have
enjoyed greater success under it than under the federal or state RFRA statutes,
particularly with respect to prisoner claims.254 Part of this success has been
attributed to Congress’s definition of “religious exercise” in RLUIPA, which
was initially absent from the federal RFRA.255 Under the federal RFRA, many
state and lower federal courts construed religious exercise narrowly, requiring
either that conduct be mandated or compelled by the claimant’s religion,256 or
be “central to” the religion to find in the claimant’s favor.257 The definitions of
exercise of religion and substantial burden were thus intertwined under RFRA.
A review of prisoner claims under the federal RFRA prior to Boerne shows
that courts commonly concluded that there was no substantial burden because
the conduct at issue was not central to, or mandated by, the prisoner’s

249

Gaubatz, supra note 244, at 517.
42 USC § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Under this definition, conduct need not be mandated by the religion, and
discretionary conduct also can receive protection if it is grounded in religious belief. Gaubatz, supra note 244,
at 522.
251 42 USC § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
252 42 USC § 2000cc-2(b).
253 42 USC § 2000cc-3(g).
254 See Gaubatz, supra note 244 (comparing the success of prisoner claims under RFRA with the success
of claims under RLUIPA from 2001 to 2005).
255 Id. at 505. Congress has since incorporated RLUIPA’s definition of religious exercise into RFRA. 42
USC § 2000bb-2(4).
256 See Gaubatz, supra note 244 at 510 (noting that the Eleventh, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, in
addition to state and district courts, took this approach).
257 See id. at 532 (noting the findings of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as
state and district courts).
250
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beliefs.258 This has led some scholars to conclude that the inclusion of a
broader definition of “religious exercise” under RLUIPA prevents courts from
limiting the effect of RLUIPA because it discourages construing “religious
exercise” narrowly.259
At least one study indicates that the distinctions between RFRA and
RLUIPA, including the definition of the term “religious exercise” and the
naming of specific categories of claims, have made an appreciable difference
in the outcome of litigation. As of 2005, forty-six cases had addressed the
merits in RLUIPA cases involving prisoners.260 Of these cases, only seven
were dismissed for failure to demonstrate a substantial burden on religious
exercise.261 This stands in contrast with prisoner claims brought under RFRA,
of which seventy-five percent were dismissed. At least some claims regarding
land use regulations have enjoyed similar success.262
V. A PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME FOR PROTECTING RELIGIOUS
OBJECTORS
Because not all states provide statute-specific religious exemptions from
laws that protect same-sex couples,263 and because free exercise jurisprudence,
as well as federal and state RFRA laws and RLUIPA, all fail to offer such
exemptions, a new solution is needed to protect the religious liberty of those
objecting to the establishment of same-sex relationships. Though at least one
scholar has suggested that issues of conscience should be resolved through

258

Id. at 528.
Id. at 505.
260 Id. at 557.
261 Id. at 569. Success under RLUIPA is not unlimited, however. See, e.g., Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d
897, 906–08 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that prison policies prohibiting male inmates from wearing beards and
hair below the collar did not violate RLUIPA because the state has a compelling interest in prisoner safety and
security, and the policy was narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
262 See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding
that a zoning board’s denial of a permit application for a religious school violated RLUIPA); Guru Nanak Sikh
Soc’y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a county’s denial of a
conditional use permit to build a Sikh temple on land zoned for agricultural use violated RLUIPA). But see
Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a zoning
ordinance that prohibited churches from operating in an industrial zone did not substantially burden religious
exercise and therefore did not violate RLUIPA).
263 See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of states that provide members of the clergy
with religious exemptions from same-sex marriage laws.
259
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social and economic, rather than legal or political, means,264 the following
sections explain that a statute protecting the right of conscience need not be as
one-sided as legislation in this area has typically been. Section A compares the
benefits of state and federal statutes and concludes that, although state statutes
are preferable to federal ones because of limitations on congressional power, a
federal statute is still needed. Thus section B proposes a federal law modeled
after RLUIPA.
A. State vs. Federal Approaches
Unlike the conflict between the federal Constitutional right to abortion or
contraception and the conscience rights of health care workers, the conflict
discussed here pits the state rights of same-sex couples against the conscience
rights of religious objectors.265 Although in some respects this distinction
indicates that the state would be the most appropriate forum for resolving the
dispute, the need for uniformity and the unlikelihood that states will address
the growing conflict suggest the need for a federal statute.
1. Benefits of State Solutions
State statutory solutions would be beneficial, and arguably better than
federal ones, for two reasons. First, states possess broader authority to
legislate than Congress. Congress’s power to legislate is limited by the powers
enumerated in the Constitution, but state legislatures are not similarly
bound.266 Additionally, Congress must ensure that statutes do not raise
concerns of federalism or sovereign immunity under the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments,267 but states may legislate freely without regard to these
concerns as long as the legislation has not been preempted by federal law.268
For these reasons, states may enact more comprehensive legislation in many
areas, offering that offers greater protection to a broader class of potential
claimants, than can Congress.
Second, most of the current rights of same-sex partners are rights conferred
by state law. With the exception of a few internal government policies and two
Supreme Court cases expanding rights for homosexuals (though not
264

See Vischer, supra note 22, at 95–98 (arguing for a marketplace approach to protect pharmacists’ right
of conscience).
265 See supra Part I.A.
266 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the powers of Congress).
267 U.S. CONST. amends. X, XI.
268 See infra note 274 (discussing preemption).
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recognizing a right to same-sex marriage or the treatment of homosexuals as a
suspect class), same-sex partners do not enjoy special protection as a class
under federal law.269 The fact that the state is the source of the rights of samesex couples could mean that the state is the most natural and appropriate forum
for balancing these two sets of rights. However, as noted below, this fact also
supports the use of a federal statute.
2. Benefits of Federal Solutions
Given the success of state conscience clauses in protecting the rights of
doctors who refuse to perform abortions, one might wonder whether state
statutes alone could provide sufficient protection for religious objectors to
same-sex unions.270 While state statutory exemptions like those in New
Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont should be encouraged, there is reason to think
that state statutes will not emerge in this area either as quickly or as uniformly
as they did in the abortion context. By passing conscience clauses related to
abortion, states were reacting to a newly recognized federal constitutional right
that conflicted with the religious views of some doctors.271 Here, the conflict
arises from newly recognized state rights, which could make state solutions to
the conflict less likely. If one views the conflict between same-sex rights and
religious conscience rights as a showdown with just one winner and one
loser,272 states providing rights to same-sex couples may have already chosen a
side.
Even if some states weigh in with statutory protections, it is unlikely that
all states will create similar protections. This could lead to a patchwork of
different levels of protection in different states similar to the existing variation
in state health care conscience clauses.273 In contrast, a federal statute would
provide a uniform approach, or at least a minimum standard, for protecting
religious objectors. Further, a federal statute would have the added benefit of
preempting any conflicting state law that might impose an affirmative
obligation on religious objectors.274
269

See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the current rights of same-sex couples under federal law).
See supra Part IV.A (discussing state conscience clauses for pharmacists).
271 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 81–86 (describing legislative responses to protect doctors who refused to
perform abortions in the wake of Roe v. Wade).
272 See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 22 at 88 (criticizing scholars on both sides of the debate over the
conscience rights of pharmacists for viewing the conflict as a “zero-sum game”).
273 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 90 (describing variation in conscience clause protections).
274 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.7 (2000) (“The State concedes, as it
must, that in addressing the subject of the federal Act, Congress has the power to preempt the state statute.”
270
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B. The RLUIPA as a Model for a Federal Conscience Statute
A comparison of the success of RLUIPA with the shortcomings of RFRA
demonstrates that RLUIPA contains several improvements that could be
incorporated into a religious conscience statute. First, RLUIPA provides
guidance for how to create a statute that is better able to withstand
constitutional challenges. Second, it shows that by narrowing the scope of the
statute to specific types of claims and defining key terms in the statute,
Congress can better achieve its goal of protecting the intended class of
claimants. This second lesson of RLUIPA is particularly relevant as it applies
to both state and federal statutes.
1. A Broader Scope: Beyond Funding Legislation
Under the RLUIPA model, Congress maximizes its authority to enact
legislation by utilizing the full extent of its powers under both the Spending
Clause and the Commerce Clause.275 As with RLUIPA, the Spending Clause
could cover a broad range of activities related to the rights of same-sex
couples. Federal funding of healthcare facilities could be used to bring
healthcare workers within the statute, and Congress could potentially regulate
areas like adoption through ties to funding of state child welfare systems. It
would likely be more difficult to tie federal funding to marriage.
For areas that fall outside the scope of the Spending Clause,276 Congress
should include a commerce-based jurisdictional clause similar to the one in
RLUIPA, providing that the statute covers any burdens that substantially affect
foreign or interstate commerce, or activities that would substantially affect
such commerce if the burden were removed.277 Such a clause might bring
within the scope of the statute any situations where a couple crosses state lines
to obtain services.278 The scope of the statute could also be broadened to cover
(emphasis added)). Because the issue of preemption is largely a matter of congressional intent, the statute
should clearly state that it preempts state law. See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)
(analyzing whether the Federal Boat Safety Act preempted state common law tort claims); see also Karen A.
Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149
(1998) (reviewing the history of preemption and discussing the complexities of the Court’s preemption
analysis).
275 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the powers that Congress used to enact RLUIPA).
276 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
277 See supra Part IV.C (describing the jurisdictional clauses of RLUIPA).
278 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (“Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities.” (emphasis added)).
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a wide range of activities related to same-sex marriage ceremonies if Congress
could demonstrate that in the aggregate, same-sex marriage ceremonies or civil
union ceremonies have a substantial affect on interstate commerce.279
This argument might not be successful in light of United States. v.
Morrison, where the Court held that, because gender-motivated violence is not
an economic activity and because Congress failed to show that this activity
“substantially affected interstate commerce,” Congress lacked sufficient power
under the Commerce Clause to pass the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA). 280 This is particularly true since the areas of marriage and family
are traditionally regulated by the state.281 However, the Court might view the
provision of services in connection with marriage ceremonies as constituting
economic activity in a way that violence against women does not.282 Even if
the courts were to ultimately take a narrow approach to the scope of the statute
under the Commerce Clause, by utilizing a jurisdictional provision and
combining congressional power under the Spending Clause and the Commerce
Clause, Congress can provide protection to the fullest extent of its powers
under the Constitution.283
2. A Method for Limiting the Scope of Exemptions
Some limits must be placed on the types of exemptions or accommodations
allowed for religious objectors.284 Otherwise, instead of balancing the rights at
stake, exemptions will always privilege the rights of religious objectors over
the rights of same-sex couples, regardless of the circumstances or nature of the
religious objection. Therefore, both the nature of the exemption and the
availability of alternative service providers should be considered in
determining whether an exemption should be granted. These considerations
can be incorporated into a strict scrutiny analysis.285 The nature of the
279 See Gaubatz, supra note 244, at 538 (arguing that administration of prisoners might fall within the
scope of RLUIPA because states frequently send prisoners to facilities in other states).
280 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–19 (2000).
281 See id. at 615–16 (raising the concern that “Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority,” noting that “the suppression of
[violent crime] has always been the prime object of the States’ police power,” and describing “family law” as
an area “of traditional state regulation”).
282 The economic activity would be the provision of services in connection with marriage and family
rather than the marriage itself.
283 See Morrison, 529 at 613 (noting the absence of a jurisdictional clause in VAWA).
284 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
285 The analysis would mirror the analysis used in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963), and
in some post-Smith state constitutional decisions, discussed supra Part III.C. However, given the limits of
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exemption goes to the weight of the burden on the claimant and the strength of
the state’s compelling interest. The availability of alternative service providers
indicates whether the state has used the least restrictive means for achieving its
interest.
By employing a strict scrutiny analysis for claims brought under the
proposed statute instead of creating an absolute exemption, Congress could
create a flexible scheme that would allow courts to balance the rights of samesex couples with the rights of religious objectors.286 This would weaken
criticism that by passing the statute, Congress is attempting to completely
undermine states’ rights or permit religious objectors to mechanically trump
the rights of same-sex couples. The requirement that states employ the least
restrictive means for achieving a compelling interest would protect most
religious objectors because there will generally be other providers who can
perform the same services.287 If, however, Congress chose to pass a
comprehensive act, covering many different, for example, where conscience
conflicts with the right to same-sex marriage, the delivery of healthcare
services or pharmaceuticals, or the right to make personal decisions about
healthcare treatment, a narrow tailoring requirement would become especially
important and could yield different outcomes depending on the interests at
stake.
In light of the problems with RFRA, any religious conscience statute, state
or federal, that requires a strict scrutiny analysis should include explicit
definitions of key terms.288 This will ensure that the flexibility mentioned
above does not come at the expense of claimants who Congress intended to
cover under the statute. For instance, Congress could refer to burdens on
“conscience” rather than burdens on “religious exercise” and could define
burdens on conscience to include any requirement that an individual directly
contribute to or participate in acts against their religious beliefs. This
definition would exclude most potential claims by places of public
accommodation because the act of providing services to homosexuals would
not involve directly participating in the formation of a union or the
these state constitutional decisions, the statute should make it clear that the goal of prohibiting discrimination
is not sufficient to overcome a strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, the narrow tailoring requirement must be
examined separately in the context of each case.
286 See Vischer, supra note 22 (arguing for a more balanced approach to the conflict between pharmacist
rights and healthcare rights).
287 See, for example, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d
959, 963 (Cal. 2008), where the plaintiff was able to receive IUI from another service provider.
288 See supra Part IV.C (comparing RLUIPA to RFRA).
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establishment of a family.289 For instance, it would not cover a restaurant
owner who refused to allow a same-sex couple to dine in his or her restaurant,
but it would cover professionals like the doctors in North Coast.
The scope of the religious conscience statute should clarified by including a
list of specific claimants or specific spheres of conflict.290 The statute could
either track RLUIPA by providing separate sections for each sphere of conflict
or class of claimants,291 or it could simply provide a list of examples. The
benefit of including separate sections, similar to RLUIPA, is that the statute
would be easier to interpret. The downside, however, is that this could
foreclose relief in areas not included in the statutory list of examples.
3. An Ability to Withstand Potential Constitutional Challenges
If a federal statute is indeed the best way to protect religious conscience, in
addition to ensuring that the statute is grounded in the necessary Article I
powers, Congress must ensure that the measure can withstand other
constitutional challenges. The most likely challenges would be raised under
the Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment. RLUIPA has been
challenged on both grounds, and the statute has survived so far. Similarly, the
statute proposed here should survive any constitutional challenges on these
grounds.
a. Establishment Clause Challenges
In addition to protecting free exercise of religion, the First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law affecting the establishment of any
religion.”292 In challenging RLUIPA, opponents argued that the law was
impermissible under the Establishment Clause, in part because it gave greater
protection to religious rights than to other constitutional rights.293 In Cutter v.
Wilkinson, the Court upheld RLUIPA against exactly this claim because the
law did not single out any particular religion for either special or

289 There are exceptions to this general statement. For example, the owner of a place of public
accommodation, such as a restaurant or hotel, who is asked to host a wedding ceremony might face a “burden”
under the statute, although the level of burden imposed on such an owner may not rise to the same level as the
burden imposed on a minister who is asked to perform the ceremony.
290 The claimants should include religious organizations as well as individuals, as under RLUIPA.
291 See supra Part IV.C.
292 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
293 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).
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disadvantaged treatment.294 Although the Court noted that its ruling did not
foreclose the possibility of future as-applied challenges, or challenges brought
under other constitutional provisions,295 the decision in Cutter makes it likely
that a federal statute modeled after RLUIPA will survive any facial challenges
under the Establishment Clause.
b. Tenth Amendment Challenges
The Tenth Amendment limits the power of Congress to regulate state
activities.296 For example, the Supreme Court has said that the Tenth
Amendment prohibits Congress from using its power to “directly compel the
States to require or prohibit” certain acts.297 Several defendants have
challenged RLUIPA under the Tenth Amendment. Although this issue has not
yet reached the Supreme Court, the few circuit courts that have addressed the
question are in agreement that RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth
Amendment.298 As the Second Circuit has found, RLUIPA does not compel
states to “require or prohibit” any specific act; instead, it allows states the
discretion to regulate the activity covered by the Act as long as the state’s
regulation does not substantially burden religious exercise in violation of the
statute.299 By requiring a strict scrutiny analysis instead of providing a total
exemption, the federal religious conscience statute proposed here would
similarly give states discretion to regulate the activities at issue as long as the
states do not violate the rights of objectors under the statute.
4. Effects of the Statute Outside of Litigation
Some critics might assert that this legislation would produce a flood of
litigation, but the statute would most likely be used as a defense by individuals,
who are accused of violating the rights of same-sex couples.300 In this sense,
the religious conscience statute would not create litigation because those

294

Id.
Id.
296 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
297 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
298 E.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 355 (2d Cir. 2007); Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2004); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002).
299 Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 355.
300 See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 967
(Cal. 2008) (where the defendants invoked state and federal free exercise claims as a defense to the plaintiff’s
allegations that the defendants violated the state civil rights statute).
295
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protected by the statute would use it as a defensive shield rather than a sword
with which they would sue. In fact, the statute might even deter litigation by
encouraging individuals and states to develop their own systems for protecting
both the right of conscience and any conflicting rights so that all parties can
enjoy their rights without resorting to a lengthy court proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the rights of same-sex couples and the rights of
religious objectors highlights the deficiencies in the Court’s current free
exercise jurisprudence, which relies heavily on states and legislatures to protect
religious objectors. The rights of same-sex couples are nearly all derived from
state law; thus, it makes sense to balance the rights of these two groups at the
state level, through state level statutes or religious exemptions. However,
North Coast illustrates a failure of heightened standards of scrutiny at the state
level to protect the rights of religious objectors. In the wake of North Coast,
and the overall failure of state RFRAs and stricter state interpretations of free
exercise to provide greater protections for religious objectors, the need for
federal protection of religious objectors is more pronounced. RLUIPA
provides an effective model for creating a more effective, yet flexible, statute.
By combining its power under the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause,
Congress can cover the broadest field of potential claims allowed under the
Constitution. By defining terms and requiring a strict scrutiny analysis under
the statute, Congress can give courts the direction needed to ensure a proper
reading of the statute while still allowing courts the flexibility to consider the
rights of same-sex couples who might be adversely affected by religious
exemptions.
ERIN N. EAST∗

∗ J.D. Candidate, Emory University School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia (2010); B.A., Yale University
(2004). I would like to thank Professor John Witte, Jr. for offering his guidance and expertise throughout the
writing process and my colleagues on the editorial board of the Emory Law Journal for their suggestions and
assistance during the editorial process. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their never-ending
encouragement and support.

EAST GALLEYSFINAL

310

10/30/2009 3:13:53 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

